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Agents' valuations are interdependent if they depend on the signals of all agents. 
Previous literature has claimed that with interdependent valuations and multidimen-
sional, but independent, signals, efficient auction design is impossible. This paper 
shows that, on the contrary, it is always possible to find efficient auction mechanisms. 
Furthermore, it characterizes the conditions under which it is possible to extract the full 
surplus from the agents. Finally, it shows that it is also possible to provide agents with 
the incentives for the efficient, ex-ante acquisition of information. All these results rest 
on the application of a generalized version of the revelation principle, which requires 
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In the last 10 years there has been a burst of renewed interest in auctions and auction
design. From the sale of new assets and the privatization of old companies, to the
design of new markets, many important practical problems have provided empiricists
with new data to study and theorists with interesting, open problems to solve.
From a theoretical standpoint, auction design should be viewed as part of mech-
anism design with transferable utility. The di®erence is that auctions typically deal
with a discrete set of assets to be assigned to agents, while mechanism design allows
more general decision sets. All the results in this paper apply to auction as well as to
more general mechanism design problems; hence, I will use the terms `auction' and
`mechanism' design interchangeably.
Consider the following basic setup. (1) There is a set of possible decisions a®ecting
all the individuals (e.g., assets to be allocated); allocative externalities are allowed.
(2) Each individual receives private signals (has private information) about his own
characteristics, or type. An agent's type can be multidimensional, but it only a®ects
the agent in question; that is, there are no informational externalities. (3) An agent's
payo® depends on the decision and his own type in a general fashion and it also
depend, linearly, on his own monetary transfer. The seminal contributions of Vickrey
(1963) and later Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) showed that in such a world e±cient
decisions (the ones that maximize the sum of agent's payo®s) can be implemented by
using appropriate monetary transfers. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism
accomplishes this by aligning every agent's payo® with social welfare. This is done,
essentially, by using transfers that make each agent the residual claimant of the social
surplus and then cover any de¯cit with additional charges that do not depend on his
own behavior.
In many practical instances the assumption of private values, or no informational
externalities, is violated. Informational externalities are present if the payo® of an
agent depends not only on his own type, but also on the types (or informational
1signals) of the other agents. Following common usage, I will call this case the case
of interdependent valuations. Among the many possible examples of interdependent
valuations, consider the following three situations. First, a procedure must be set
up to assign the mineral rights for a tract of land. Second, an existing company is
either being acquired by one of several rivals, or it is going to be split among them.
Third, a state-owned enterprise is being privatized. In all cases, it is highly likely
that di®erent parties have access to di®erent informational signals that are relevant
in making an e±cient decision, some of which a®ect, possibly in di®erent ways, all
parties. Note also that in all these cases it is quite likely that the informational
signals are multidimensional. For example, a ¯rm bidding for a tract of land may
have signals about the quantity and quality of the minerals to be found and about
its own cost of extraction.
Interdependent valuations have been extensively studied in the auction literature
that followed from Milgrom and Weber (1982). This literature, however, for the
most part has restricted attention to symmetric bidders with a single dimensional
informational signal and a single unit to be allocated among them. Furthermore, the
focus has been more on the properties of speci¯c auction procedures, than on the
general design problem.
Recently, Maskin (1992), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), and Jehiel and Moldovanu
(2001) have generalized the VCG setup, by allowing for informational externalities.
They demonstrated, in increasing generality, that if informational signals are mul-
tidimensional (or, if they are single dimensional but a single crossing condition is
violated), statistically independent, and there are informational externalities, then
the e±cient decision rule cannot be implemented by any standard mechanism: incen-
tive compatibility and e±ciency are mutually exclusive.
Bergemann and VÄ alimÄ aki (2002) have looked at the case in which valuations are
interdependent, but signals are single dimensional and a single crossing condition
is satis¯ed. In this case there are standard mechanisms that implement the e±cient
2decision rule. However, they showed that no such mechanism provides agents with the
incentives for e±cient ex-ante acquisition of information; agents either under-acquire,
or over-acquire information.
The word standard is italicized for a good reason. In all these papers the mecha-
nism designer is allowed to ask agents to report their types, as in a standard mech-
anism design problem with private values, but he is not allowed to ask agents to
report their (pre-monetary transfer) payo®s from the decision after a decision has
been taken. Clearly, at some point an agent will have to observe his payo® from a
decision. With private values, an agent cannot extract any new information from the
observation of his own payo®. On the contrary, with interdependent valuations ob-
serving his realized payo® provides the agent with new information about the types,
or informational signals, of the other agents. The designer, then, should collect this
information and use it. The transfers made to the agents should depend not only on
the agents' reports of their types, but also on their reports of the decision payo®s.
Restricting attention to standard mechanisms, with only type reports, is not without
loss of generality when valuations are interdependent. This insight is the starting
point of this paper.
I allow the mechanism designer to set up two reporting stages. In the ¯rst stage
the designer asks about the agents' types. On the basis of these reports, the designer
selects a decision. After the decision has taken e®ect, the designer asks the agents to
report their realized payo®s in a second reporting stage. Then transfers are ¯nalized
that depend on reports in both stages. It turns out that allowing the transfers to
depend on the payo® reports completely changes the conclusions of the model with
interdependent valuations and multidimensional signals.
First, it is always possible to implement an e±cient decision (it is also possible
to balance the budget). Second, under some conditions the designer can extract the
full surplus from the agents. A necessary and su±cient condition for full surplus
extraction is provided in the paper. Third, it is always possible to implement the
3e±cient decision and to provide agents with the correct incentives for e±cient ex-
ante acquisition of information.
A ¯rst pass at the intuition for my e±ciency results is the following. The designer
should implement the decision that is e±cient given the signal reports of the agents
in the ¯rst reporting stage. Each agent should be given as a transfer the sum of the
reported payo®s by all other agents in the second reporting stage. This is su±cient to
make the agent a residual claimant, and hence gives him the incentive to truthfully
report his signals in the ¯rst reporting stage. We will see that the de¯cit so created
can be covered by imposing charges on each agent that do not depend on his behavior.
Furthermore, if there is an ex-ante stage when agents can aquire information, then
they will acquire the e±cient level, since each agent's incentives are aligned with
the social good. In a sense that will be made precise later, the introduction of the
payo® reporting stage after a decision has been made allows us to generalize the VCG
mechanism to the case of interdependent valuations.
The condition that guarantees that the designer can extract the full surplus es-
sentially says that any potentially pro¯table lie by an agent about his type in the
¯rst reporting stage should be detectable with positive probability from the payo®
reports of the other agents. If this is so, then, when a lie is detected, the agent can
be severely punished, making lying unpro¯table.
It is important to emphasize that in this paper, as well as in the previous work
by Maskin (1992), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001), and
Bergemann and VÄ alimÄ aki (2002) (see also Ausubel (1997) and Perry and Reny (2002))
the agents' signals are statistically independent. The focus on independent types
can be easily explained. We already know from Cr¶ emer and McLean (1985, 1988),
McAfee and Reny (1992), and more recently McLean and Postlewaite (2001), that
e±ciency and full surplus extraction are possible under general conditions when there
is correlation of types across agents.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model and
4explains the inadequacy of standard mechanisms, by using three simple examples.
Section 3 shows that the appropriate version of the revelation principle in a world
with informational externalities requires that the designer ask agents to report their
types in the ¯rst reporting stage, and ask them to report realized payo®s after a
decision has been made, but before transfers are ¯nalized. Section 4 shows that it is
always possible to implement e±cient mechanisms. Section 5 provides the necessary
and su±cient condition for full surplus extraction. It also presents two versions of a
model due to Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001), which show that full surplus extraction
requires that no signal be purely private. Section 6 shows that it is possible to
have both e±cient ex-post decisions and e±cient ex-ante acquisition of information.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Inadequacy of the Standard Revelation Mecha-
nisms
I study an auction, or, more generally, a mechanism design model with n agents. Each
agent has private information about his own type µi 2 £i,w h e r e£ i is a closed and
bounded subset of Rmi.L e t£=£n
i=1£i be theset of type pro¯les andµ =( µ1;:::;µ n)
be a generic element of £. Type µi is drawn from the cumulative probability distri-
bution Fi with support £i. In Section 3, I will derive a generalized version of the
revelation principle without imposing any restriction on the distributions Fi;t h a ti s ,
I will allow for correlation across types of di®erent agents. In all other sections I
will assume that the distributions Fi are independent. Let X be the set of possible
decisions, or outcomes (e.g., X could be a subset of an Euclidean space and represent
the set of possible allocations of private and public goods). Agent i's payo® function
Ui : X £ £ £ R ! R depends on the decision x, the type pro¯le µ and his monetary
transfer ti;w eh a v e
Ui(x;µ;ti)=ui(x;µ)+ti:
5I assume that the payo® function is linear in money and that it depends on the
types of all agents. This latter assumption is what distinguishes the interdependent
valuations case from that of private values, in which Ui only depends on µi.( G r e s i k
(1991) was one of the ¯rst to study a mechanism design problem with interdependent
valuations; Maskin (1992) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) use the terms \common
values" and \interdependent valuations" interchangeably.)
To gain a simple intuitive understanding of this paper's contributions, it is best
to start from the following examples.
Example 1. The ¯rst example is a simple modi¯cation of an example in Maskin
(1992) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2000). There is an item for sale and two potential
buyers (e.g., the item could be the right to drill oil on a tract of land and the buyers
could be two wildcatters). The two buyers' valuations for the item are
u1 =2 µ1
u2 =4 µ1 ¡ 2
where µ1 2 [0;2] is a private signal of buyer 1 (his type). We can think of µ1 as the
expected quantity of oil in the tract, 2 and 4 as player 1 and 2's marginal revenues,
and 0 and 2 as their ¯xed costs. E±ciency requires that buyer 1 get the item if µ1 < 1
and that buyer 2 get it if µ1 > 1. As in a standard mechanism design model, suppose
that the transfers and the decision depend on the players' reports about their types.
Let t1 :[ 0 ;2] ! R be buyer 1's transfer function and suppose that the decision rule
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a contradiction. Maskin (1992) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) point out that the
cause of the incompatibility between e±ciency and incentive compatibility in this
example is that @u1=@µ1 <@ u 2=@µ1. They show that if players types are single-
dimensional, @ui=@µi > 0 for all i, and the \single crossing" condition @ui=@µi >
@uj=@µi holds for all i and j 6= i, then e±cient standard mechanisms exist. (See also
Ausubel (1997), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001), Bergemann and VÄ alimÄ aki (2002), and
Perry and Reny (2002).)
The next example shows that with multi-dimensional types there are no natural
conditions that guarantee the existence of e±cient standard mechanisms.
Example 2. As before, there are two players and one item for sale. The two
players could be two bidders for a good, or a buyer and a seller. Player 1 has private
information about two signals, q 2 [1;2] and c 2 [0;2] (e.g., q could be the quantity
of oil in the tract whose drilling rights are for sale and c could be player 1's ¯xed
cost of extraction; see Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) for a similar example). Player 2
has no private information. Let t1 and t2 be the transfers to the two players. The
realized payo®s if player 2 gets the item with probability ± are
u1 =( 1 ¡ ±)(2q ¡ c)+t1
u2 = ±q + t2:
Again, in a standard mechanism the transfers and the decision depend on the reported
types. Suppose that the decision rule is e±cient. Ex-post e±ciency requires that
player 1 get the item if q>ca n dt h a tp l a y e r2g e ti ti fq<c ; that is, the probability






1i f qr <c r
0i f qr >c r
Let q1, q2, c1, c2 satisfy the following inequalities
c1 >q 1 >q 2 >c 2
q1 ¡ q2 > (c1 ¡ q1)+( q2 ¡ c2):
Then the transfer function t1 :[ 1 ;2] £ [0;2] ! R of an e±cient standard mechanism
must satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraints:
t1(q1;c 1) ¸ t1(q2;c 2)+2 q1 ¡ c1
t1(q2;c 2)+2 q2 ¡ c2 ¸ t1(q1;c 1);
adding up the constraints we obtain a contradiction:
(c1 ¡ q1)+( q2 ¡ c2) ¸ q1 ¡ q2:
Maskin (1992), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) show,
at di®erent levels of generality, that with multi-dimensional types this example cor-
responds to the generic case; that is, it is impossible to construct e±cient standard
mechanisms.
I now show that an e±cient mechanism can be found in both examples if the
mechanism designer can ask the players to report their realized payo®s. Denote by
ur
i the payo® reported by player i prior to the monetary transfer. The designer
should set up two reporting stages. In the ¯rst stage players report their types and a
decision is implemented according to their reports. In the second stage payo®s (ur
i)
a r er e p o r t e da n dt r a n s f e r sm a d et h a td e p e n do nb o t ht y p ea n dp a y o ®r e p o r t s .A sw e
8shall see, in both examples it is su±cient to ask only player 2 to report his realized
payo®; however, in the general case the designer should ask all players to make such
a report.






























1 ¡ 2) if µ
r
1 > 1
where h1 and h2 are constants. Note that these transfers are quite similar to the
transfers in a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (see Vickrey (1961), Clarke
(1971) and Groves (1973)) except that they depend on reported payo®s. Clearly, the
incentive compatibility constraint for agent 2 is satis¯ed, since t2 does not depend
on the reported payo® of player 2; truthful payo® reporting is optimal for agent 2.
Thus, if agent 2 gets the item he reports a payo®
u
r
2 =4 µ1 ¡ 2
Hence, agent 1's payo® from reporting µ
r









2µ1 + h1 if µ
r
1 < 1
4µ1 ¡ 2+h1 if µ
r
1 > 1
which is maximized at µ
r
1 = µ1. Telling the truth is a Bayesian equilibrium (actually
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium).









h1 if qr >c r
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h2 if qr >c r
h2 ¡ qr if qr <c r
where h1 and h2 are constants. As in the previous example, these transfers are similar
to the transfers in a VCG mechanism. Since t2 does not depend on the reported payo®,
truthful reporting of his realized payo® is incentive compatible for agent 2, so that if












2q ¡ c + h1 if qr >c r
q + h1 if qr <c r
which is maximized at qr = q and cr = c. Telling the truth is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
Two remarks are in order. First, in both examples telling the truth is not a
dominant strategy equilibrium. If one player deviates from truthtelling, the other
may also want to deviate. Telling the truth, however, is a best reply for agent i
independently of his beliefs about the other players. That is, telling the truth is an ex-
post equilibrium: it remains a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for any prior distribution
over types. Second, telling the truth is not the unique equilibrium of the mechanisms
discussed in the examples and of the more general mechanisms we will construct
in Section 4. These are features common to most papers in the literature. For
example, Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) propose an auction procedure that is e±cient
for single-dimensional types (and valuations satisfying a single crossing condition);
10in their auction \truthful bidding" is an ex-post equilibrium (see also Bergemann
and VÄ alimÄ aki (2002)), but it is not a dominant strategy, and it is not necessarily
the unique equilibrium. However, as they point out, it should be possible to use the
literature on full Bayesian implementation surveyed by Palfrey (1992) to construct
more complex mechanisms without the untruthful equilibria.
The crucial feature in the examples is that by observing his payo® an agent ac-
quires new information. In particular, agent 2 learns one of the private signals of
agent 1. It is not necessary for the payo® to perfectly reveal a signal of the other
agent for e±ciency to be possible. To see this, suppose that in example 2 u2 is a
random variable that depends on the true value of q. In particular, assume that q
is the expected value of u2 if agent 2 gets the item. Given the assumption of risk
neutrality of agent 2, it is clear that the transfers in (1) implement the e±cient de-
cision in this case as well. As we shall see in Section 4, e±ciency can be achieved in
the general case, and does not require that the private signal of any agent becomes
known after the payo® realizations. Since valuations are interdependent, the decision
payo® provides an agent with new information; extracting this information from all
agents is su±cient for the designer to design transfers that implement the e±cient
decision.
Let me now take up the issue of balancing the budget. In an auction setup one
should require that for all possible type realizations the transfers to the agents add
up to at most zero (so that the auctioneer doesn't need to transfer money to the
agents). In a setup in which there is no auctioneer (e.g., a buyer-seller relationship),
the appropriate (ex-post) budget balancing condition is that the transfers add up
exactly to zero for all type realizations. This second condition is more stringent than




















in the second example. By setting h1 = ¡h2, one obtains that in equilibrium the
budget is balanced for all possible realizations of µ1 in the ¯rst example and all
realizations of q and c in the second example. (Note, however, that o® the equilibrium
path the budget need not balance.)
Finally, by setting h1 = 0 one can guarantee participation by all types of both
agents (i.e., individual rationality). This suggests that interdependent valuations
make it easier to achieve not only ex-post e±ciency, but also budget balancing and
individual rationality (e.g., contrast these examples with the impossibility result in
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)).
Example 3. Consider now the following special case of the auction model in
Myerson (1981). There is a single item for sale and two bidders (potential buyers).
Each bidder is privately informed about his own type µi; the other players regard
µi as a random variable with uniform distribution over the interval [0;1]. Buyer i's
valuation for the object is
ui = µi + ®µj i 6= j, i;j =1 ;2,
where ® 2 (0;1) is a known parameter. The seller valuation for the object is
u0 = ®(µ1 + µ2):
Among standard revelation mechanisms, Myerson (1981) shows that the optimal
auction is any common auction (e.g., a ¯rst-price, a second-price (Vickrey), or an






(1) =m a x fµ1;µ 2g and µ
(2) =m i n fµ1;µ 2g. If the optimal auction is implemented
either by a Vickrey or by an ascending auction with reserve price R0, then bidder i
wins the object if µi = µ
(1) ¸ R0, and pays a price p equal to
p =m a x fR0;(1 + ®)µ
(2)g:
It is clear that by using this standard optimal auction the seller does not extract the
full surplus. In particular, if µ
(1) <R 0, an event having probability (R0)2, the object
goes unsold and the seller obtains a lower payo® than either buyer's valuation for the
object.
I now show that the seller could exploit the interdependence of valuations and
design a mechanism, or auction, that extracts the full surplus. Consider the following
\shoot the liar" mechanism. Bidders are ¯rst asked to report their types (in the ¯rst
reporting stage). The bidder who reports the highest type wins the object and then
he is asked to report the value obtained from the object (in the second reporting
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where L>2 is a constant. To see that the incentive compatibility constraints for the
bidders are satis¯ed (i.e., that bidder i wants to report truthfully), note ¯rst that pi
does not depend on i's reported valuation ur
i (of course, i only needs to report his
valuation if he wins the object). Hence, truthful reporting of his realized payo® is
13optimal for the winning bidder in the second reporting stage. Suppose that bidder j
truthfully reports his type in the ¯rst reporting stage and if he wins he then truthfully
reports his realized valuation in the second reporting stage. The expected payo® to
player i from reporting µ
r

















i ¡ L(1 ¡ µ
r
i);
while i's expected payo® from truthfully reporting µ
r
i = µi is zero. Clearly, for L>2,
Ui is maximized by reporting truthfully in the ¯rst stage, µ
r
i = µi (telling the truth
is a strict maximum). In this generalized revelation mechanism each bidder obtains
a zero payo® and the seller extracts the full surplus.
The \shoot the liar" mechanism contains a discrete penalty jump for being dis-

















































where °>0 is a constant. Suppose again that bidder j truthfully reports his type in
the ¯rst reporting stage and if he wins he then truthfully reports his valuation in the
second reporting stage. The expected payo® to player i from reporting µ
r
i, while his





























= ¡° (µi ¡ µ
r
i)
2 (1 ¡ µ
r
i):
Again, Ui is maximized by reporting truthfully in the ¯rst stage, µ
r
i = µi.
In Section 5, I will provide a necessary and su±cient condition for the designer to
be able to extract the full surplus from the agents in the general model. As we shall
14see, this condition requires, roughly speaking, that potentially pro¯table lies in the
¯rst reporting stage be detected with positive probability if agents truthfully report
their payo®s in the second stage.
Before discussing e±ciency, full surplus extraction, and information acquisition,
in the next section I will introduce a generalized version of the revelation principle
that is appropriate for the case of interdependent valuations.
3 The Generalized Revelation Principle
A fundamental di®erence between interdependent valuations and the private values
model is that with interdependent valuations the observation of the payo® from the
decision conveys information to an agent. As we saw in examples 1-3, this informa-
tion is potentially useful to the designer and a general model should allow him to use
it. Thus, the designer should collect messages from the agents in two stages. In the
¯rst stage the messages collected should help determine the decision to be made. The
second stage should take place after the agents have observed their payo®s from the
decision; messages from both stages should be used to determine the monetary trans-
fers to the agents. In most practical applications, the fact that monetary transfers
should not be fully completed until after a decision has been made is not a limitation.
Formally, the designer should choose a game form composed of ¯rst and second
stage message spaces M1
i and M2
i for each agent i, a decision function, and a transfer
function. The game should unfold as follows. After observing his own type each agent
i sends a message from M1
i to the designer. After receiving the ¯rst-stage messages the
designer implements a decision according to the decision function. After the decision
has been implemented and he has observed his own payo®, agent i sends a message
from M2
i to the designer. After receiving all second-stage messages, the designer
executes the monetary transfers according to the transfer function. The appropriate
equilibrium concepts for the games generated by this game form are perfect Bayesian
15equilibrium and its re¯nements. In this paper I will use perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
In this section, I will assume that we can decompose the decision as follows:
x =( z1;:::;z n;y)w h e r ezi is only observed by player i and y is publicly observable;
thus, X = £n
i=1Zi £ Y where Zi is the set of privately observable decisions of agent
i and Y is the set of publicly observable decisions. Let M¿ = £n
i=1M¿
i , ¿ =1 ;2.
A deterministic mechanism is a quadruple (M1;M2;d;t)w h e r ed : M1 ! X is
the decision rule and t : M1 £ M2 ! Rn is the transfer function. A mechanism
is a quadruple (M1;M2; e d;e t) where the decision rule and the transfer functions are
allowed to be stochastic.
Let ¦i = ui(X;£) be the range of the function ui.I fM1
i =£ i and M2
i =¦ i for
all i, then I say that the designer is using a generalized revelation mechanism. If, on
the other hand, M1
i =£ i and M2
i = ; for all i, then I say that the designer is using
a standard revelation mechanism. In a standard revelation mechanism agents are not
asked to report their payo®s from the decision. Under private values (i.e., if ui(x;µ)=
ui(x;µi) for all i) there is no loss of generality in assuming that the designer only uses
standard revelation schemes. More precisely, the standard revelation principle says
that with private values any perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of any mechanism
can be implemented as a Bayesian equilibrium outcome of a standard revelation
mechanism in which reporting his true type is an equilibrium strategy for each player.
(Clearly, all Bayesian equilibria of a standard revelation mechanism are also perfect
Bayesian equilibria.) Intuitively, in a set-up with private values, observing one's own
payo® conveys no new information to an agent and thus the designer has no need to
collect second-stage messages from the agents.
As I showed in the previous section, with interdependent valuations, restricting
the designer to use standard revelation schemes is not without loss of generality. I now
present the version of the revelation principle, that I call the generalized revelation
principle, that is appropriate for a setting with interdependent valuations.
Proposition 1 (The Generalized Revelation Principle) Any perfect Bayesian equilib-
16rium outcome of any mechanism can be implemented as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
outcome of a generalized revelation mechanism in which reporting his true payo® in
the second stage and reporting his true type in the ¯rst stage is an equilibrium strategy
for each player.
Proof. I will allow agents to use mixed strategies. Let ¢(S)b et h es e to f
probability distributions over the set S. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a given
mechanism ° =( M1;M2; e d;e t) consists of the following functions
r
1















¯i : Zi £ Y £ £i £ ¦i ! ¢(£¡i)
where ri =( r1
i;r 2
i) is the (mixed) strategy of player i and ¯i is the function mapping
a player type and the variables he observes in the ¯rst stage into his posterior beliefs




n)a n d¯ =
(¯1;:::;¯n). Suppose (r;¯) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of °. Now consider
the generalized revelation mechanism ½ =( £ ;¦;±;¿), with the transfer functions ¿i :
££¦ ! ¢(R) given by the composite functions ¿i(µ;¼)=e ti(r1(µ);r 2(e d(r1(µ));µ;¼))
and the decision function ± :£! ¢(X) given by the composite function ±(µ)=
e d(r1(µ)). Let ®1
i :£ i ! £i be the identity map and ®2
i : Zi £ Y £ £i £ ¦i ! ¦i
be the projection map de¯ned by ®2
i (zi;y;µ i;¼i)=¼i.L e t ®¿ =( ®¿
1;:::;® ¿
n), for
¿ =1 ;2a n d® =( ®1;® 2). I claim that (®;¯) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of
the generalized revelation mechanism ½ that implements the same outcome as the
equilibrium (r;¯)o f°. By construction, it is immediate that (®;¯)i n½ implements
t h es a m eo u t c o m ea s( r;¯)i n°. Furthermore, if a deviation from truthtelling were
pro¯table in ½, then we could construct an associated pro¯table deviation from (r;¯)
in °. E.g., if reporting b µi instead of µi were a pro¯table deviation for type µi in ½,
then reporting b m1
i = r1
i(b µi)i n s t e a do fr1
i(µi) and using the second-stage reporting
17strategy r2
i(zi;y;b µi;¼i) instead of r2
i(zi;y;µ i;¼i) would be a pro¯table deviation in °.
It is important to observe that in a generalized revelation mechanism, at the
beginning of the second reporting stage, each agent's expected transfer must be inde-
pendent of his payo® message; if it were not, then the agent would not want to reveal
his true payo® from the decision. The other agents' transfers, however, may vary
with agent i's second-stage report. It is precisely this feature of the second reporting
stage that allows the designer to collect new information at no cost, and to punish
deviations from truthtelling in the ¯rst stage that would not be punishable by using
a standard revelation mechanism.
From now on, I will assume that types are drawn independently across agents;
that is, the µi's are independent random variables. I will focus on the possibility of im-
plementing e±cient decision rules, on extracting the full surplus from the agents, and
on e±cient ex-ante information acquisition. The reason for focusing on independent
types is simple. We already know from the work of Cr¶ emer and McLean (1985, 1988),
McAfee and Reny (1992), and more recently McLean and Postlewaite (2001), that
e±ciency and full surplus extraction are possible under general conditions when there
is correlation of types across agents. On the other hand, Maskin (1992), Dasgupta
and Maskin (2000) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) have shown that e±ciency (and
hence full surplus extraction) is impossible if valuations are interdependent, signals
are multidimensional, and attention is restricted to standard revelation mechanisms.
4E ± c i e n c y
I will apply the generalized revelation principle and use generalized revelation mech-
anisms. Suppose that the goal of the designer is to choose an e±cient decision rule.
18The deterministic decision rule ±











i be the type and the payo® from the decision reported by agent i
in the ¯rst and second reporting stage respectively. Suppose the mechanism designer
uses the decision rule ±
¤,s ot h a ti fµ
r is the pro¯le of reported types, then the decision
is x = ±
¤(µ










The trick, analogous to the trick used in a standard Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mecha-
nism, is to make every agent the \residual claimant" of the full surplus (I will worry
later about balancing the budget). To see that this trick works, suppose that all
agents except i truthfully report their types, µ
r
¡i = µ¡i, and their decision payo®s,
while agent i of type µi falsely reports his type to be µ
0
i (note that the report of his
decision payo® does not a®ect agent i's total utility - because ¿i does not depend
on it - hence it is optimal for agent i to truthfully report his payo® in the second
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Hence, agent i will never pro¯t from falsely reporting µ
0
i; truthful reporting is a best
19reply to the truthful reporting of all the other agents. The two remarks made in
Section 2 are still valid here, and are worth recalling. First, telling the truth is
an ex-post equilibrium; that is, it remains an equilibrium for all type distributions.
Second, modi¯cations of the mechanism following techniques from the full Bayesian
implementation literature should allow the elimination of the untruthful equilibria.
Making all agents \residual claimants" could be very costly. However, it is always
















With these transfers, the mechanism is similar to the so-called pivot scheme in the
mechanism design literature with private values (a generalization of the Vickrey auc-
tion); the agent pays for the highest possible externality he causes to others (note
that here the maximum is taken not only over the decision, as in the case of private
values, but also over agent i's type).
Requiring that the budget balance (i.e., that the transfers add up to zero) is a
more restrictive condition than requiring that the designer collects a non-negative
revenue. This is the appropriate property to require of a mechanism in which the
designer is a mediator - helping out the agents to coordinate - as opposed to the case
when the designer is an agent himself (e.g., an auctioneer) trying to extract surplus
from the other agents. I will now show that the designer can balance the budget.
Let E¡i be the expectation operator over the random variable µ¡i and E be the
expectation over µ. The designer could subtract from the transfer ¿i in equation (4)
ac h a r g ehi,t h u s¯ x i n gi's total transfer ti to be equal to ¿i ¡ hi; if the additional
charge hi is designed so that its expected value is independent from the reports of



































with E¡(n+1) = E¡1. If all other agents report truthfully, then the expected value of



















where S is the ex-ante, expected (optimal) social surplus, a constant independent
from µi and µ
r
i. Hence truthful reporting remains a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
after the charges hi are subtracted from the ¿i. Note, however, that it is not an
ex-post equilibrium anymore. It is simple to check that on the equilibrium path (i.e.,
for µi = µ
r











Since we already know that e±cient Bayesian mechanisms exist if valuations are in-
dependent (e.g., D'Aspremont and G¶ erard-Varet (1979)), I have proved the following
result.
Proposition 2 Whether or not valuations are interdependent, it is always possible
to construct an e±cient, budget balancing, perfect Bayesian mechanism.
While with private valuations it is possible to make truthful revelation (but not
budget balancing) a dominant strategy for all agents, with interdependent valuation
the dominant strategy property is lost. Another minor di®erence is that with private
values it is possible to balance the budget for all possible reports, including non-
21truthful reports. On the other hand, with interdependent valuations the budget can
only be balanced on the equilibrium path. This is because the transfers must depend
on the reported decision payo®s, and not only on the reported types.
It is important to emphasize that Proposition 2 continues to hold even if payo®s
are random functions of the agents' signals; the mechanism that I have described
continues to guarantee e±ciency (recall the discussion of Example 2 in Section 2).
The close similarity of the constructions in this section to the standard VCG
schemes under private values needs to be emphasized (e.g., see Green and La®ont
(1977), HolmstrÄ om (1979) and La®ont and Maskin (1979)). In a standard VCG
mechanism, the decision and the transfer functions only depend on the reported types.
Under private values, this is not a restriction and the e±cient decision rule can be
implemented by giving each player a transfer that makes him a residual claimant.
With interdependent valuations, on the other hand, making each player a residual
claimant requires that his transfer depends on the reported payo®s of the other play-
ers. Thus, we can think of the mechanism constructed in this section as a generalized
VCG mechanism.
With private values, and for su±ciently rich domains (e.g., simply connected or
convex set of valuations) VCG mechanisms are the only ones that allow the designer
to implement the e±cient decision (e.g., see Green and La®ont (1977), HolmstrÄ om
(1979) and, more recently, Williams (1999)). Example 3 showed that with interde-
pendent valuations there are other mechanisms, besides generalized VCG schemes,
that implement the e±cient decision rule; the \shoot the liar" mechanism is not a
VCG mechanism, yet it implements the e±cient outcome in that example.
I now turn to the issue of voluntary participation of the agents in the mechanism.
I will restrict attention to generalized VCG mechanisms (which, as I just argued, is a
real restriction) and provide a su±cient condition for a mechanism to be individually
rational; that is, to induce voluntary participation. If the designer were forced to use
a generalized VCG mechanism, the condition I provide is necessary and su±cient for
22individual rationality.
Observe that incentive compatibility is not a®ected if a lump-sum transfers `i
is added to the transfer of agent i,s ot h a tti(¢)=¿i(¢) ¡ hi(¢)+`i. Obviously, if
Pn
i=1 `i = 0, then budget balancing is also guaranteed.
Let UO
i (µi)b et y p eµi of agent i's expected utility from not participating (his
outside option utility). In most applied models the utility from not participating is
taken to be type independent and is normalized to zero. However, allowing for the
outside option utility of agent i to depend on his type is more general and entails
little complication. Prior to the lump-sum transfer `i,t y p eµi of agent i's expected


















where Si(µi) is the total interim expected surplus (or gains from trade) by type µi.
Let µ
¤
i be the worst-o® type of player i
µ
¤

















be the expected loss of the worst type of agent i from participating in the generalized
VCG mechanism, prior to the issuing of the lump-sum transfer `i.I f
Pn
i=1 Li · 0,
then it is possible to add lump-sum transfers `i ¸ Li such that
Pn
i=1 `i =0a n d
induce participation by all types of all agents. It is useful to look at this inequality





Recall that S(n¡1)=n is the expected value of the charge hi to agent i.O nt h eo t h e r
23hand, Ci is the expected gain above his outside utility that the worst type of agent
i gets in the mechanism that makes him the \residual claimant" of the full surplus
(i.e., the generalized VCG mechanism before the imposition of the charge hi). Thus,
starting from the \everybody is a residual claimant" mechanism, we can think of Ci
as the maximum expected charge that can be imposed on agent i. It is clear that the


















¸ (n ¡ 1)S;
and that if they are satis¯ed then participation by all agents can be achieved.
Proposition 3 If the inequalities in (8) hold, then it is always possible to construct
an e±cient, budget balancing, individually rational, perfect Bayesian mechanism.
Makowski and Mezzetti (1994) proved the counterpart of this proposition for the
case of private valuations (in their case inequalities analogous to (8) are necessary
and su±cient for individual rationality).
5 Full Surplus Extraction
Cr¶ emer and McLean (1985, 1988) (see also McAfee and Reny (1992) and McLean and
Postlewaite (2001)) showed that full surplus extraction is generically possible when
agents' types are correlated. In their model full surplus extraction occurs at the
interim level. Each type of each agent participates in a lottery which leaves him with
zero expected surplus. As a consequence, at the ex-ante stage (i.e., before knowing
the agents' types) the auctioneer expects to extract the full surplus, while ex-post
24(i.e., when the agents' types are known) he sometimes extract more and sometimes
less than the full surplus. This raises potential problems. First, the mechanism is
not ex-post individually rational, and hence it may not work if agents have limited
liability. Second, the mechanism may not work if agents are risk averse.
In this section I will show that with interdependent valuations it is often possible
for the auctioneer to fully extract the surplus ex-post (i.e., for all type realizations)
even if signals are statistically independent. I will assume that the functions ui(x;µ)
are bounded.
Note that if all agents with the possible exception of agent i truthfully report their








i;µ ¡i);µ i;µ ¡i)
where µ
r
i is the type reported by agent i and µi is his true type. On the other hand,
on the basis of the type reports, and on the assumption that all agents are being










i;µ ¡i) for j =1 ;:::;n:
In general, any di®erence between j's reported and predicted payo® provides the
designer with evidence of deceit: some agent lied at the type reporting stage (assuming
that agent j has no incentive to lie at the payo® reporting stage). The designer could
then impose severe penalties on all but agent j.L e tk¢k denote the supnorm in Rn¡1.
The distance between predicted and reported payo®s as a function of µ¡i and the
















¡i are the vectors of predicted and reported payo®s by all players










































i;µ i)i st h es e to ft y p e so ft h eo t h e ra g e n t sf o rw h i c ht h ed e s i g n e r
cannot detect the lie µ
r
i by type µi of agent i.L e t¢ i (µ
r
i;µ i) measure the probability
that the distance between predicted and reported payo®s, as a function of the true










I am now ready to introduce an identi¯ability condition which guarantees that
the designer can extract all the surplus from the agents.
Assumption I: For all i,a l lµi and all µ
r
i with µi 6= µ
r









i;µ ¡i)] > 0
holds, then it must be ¢i(µ
r
i;µ i) > 0.
Assumption I says that if player i of type µi expects the di®erence between his ac-
tual and his predicted payo® ui to be positive when reporting µ
r
i, then the probability
of being detected lying must be strictly greater than zero. Given that the functions
ui are bounded, Assumption I is equivalent to
Assumption I
0: For all i,a l lµi and all µ
r
i with µi 6= µ
r









i;µ ¡i)] · L¢i(µ
r
i;µ i):
I will now show that Assumption I is necessary and su±cient for full surplus
26extraction.
Proposition 4 Full surplus extraction is possible (with bounded penalties) if and only
if Assumption I holds.
Proof. First I show that I is su±cient. Consider the following mechanism. The
decision rule is the e±cient deterministic rule ±



















































Suppose that all the other agents truthfully report their types and decision payo®s.
F i r s tn o t et h a ta g e n ti's total payo® does not depend on his reported decision payo®.
Furthermore, if agent i of type µi truthfully reports his type, then he gets a zero total
payo®. On the other hand, if he reports type µ
r









i;µ ¡i)] ¡ L¢i (µ
r
i;µ i);




I now need to show that Assumption I is necessary for full surplus extraction.
Given any mechanism using the e±cient decision rule ±
¤ :£! X,w ec a nw r i t et h e






















since i's total payo® should not depend on his reported payo®. If all the other agents
truthfully report their types and decision payo®s, while agent i of type µi reports
27type µ
r
















Full surplus extraction requires that for all µi it must be
E¡i [°i(µi;µ¡i;u ¡i(±
¤(µi;µ¡i);µ i;µ ¡i))] = 0: (12)











i;µ ¡i)] > 0( 1 3 )
and ¢i (µ
r
i;µ i)=0 .B u t¢ i(µ
r






























i;µ ¡i);µ i;µ ¡i))] = 0;
which, together with (13), implies that the expression in (11) is positive and hence
type µi pro¯ts from reporting µ
r
i. As a result, full surplus extraction is not possible
if Assumption I is violated.
In the following subsection I will apply this result to the linear model with a
discrete choice set studied by Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001).
285.1 A Linear Model with a Discrete Choice Set
Suppose that the decision set X contains a ¯nite number of elements, X = fx1;:::;x kg.
In the ¯rst version of the model, the type set £i of each player i is a compact subset




i ) is the type of player i, then we should think of µ
k
i as the
signal of player i that a®ects the payo®s of all players if xk is the selected decision.
For all i, j and xk,l e t®k
ij be a scalar representing the weight of the signal µ
k
j on








j + ti: (14)
In the second version of the model, the type set £i of each player i is a compact








iN) is the type of player i,t h e nw e
should think of µ
k
ij as the signal of player i that a®ects the payo®s of player j if xk is








ji + ti: (15)
For simplicity, in both versions of the model I will assume that the distribution
functions Fi have the property that every open subset of £i has positive probability
measure. Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) showed that if one restricts attention to
standard revelation mechanisms, both versions of the model are incompatible with
e±ciency (for generic type sets). I will now show that Assumption I holds, generically,
in the ¯rst version of the model, while it fails in the second. Thus, full surplus
extraction is always possible in the ¯rst version, but not in the second. (As we know
from Proposition 2, e±ciency can be obtained in both versions of the model using a
generalized VCG mechanism.)
Proposition 5 Suppose players' payo® functions are given by (14), £i is a compact
subset of RK for all i, and that if ®k
ii 6=0and xk 2 X is the e±cient decision in
29an open subset of £ then there exists j 6= i such that ®k
ji 6=0 . Then full surplus
extraction is possible.
Proof. I only need to show that Assumption I holds. Suppose that there exists
i, µi and µ
r









i;µ ¡i)] > 0;
so that Assumption I requires that ¢i(µ
r
i;µ i) > 0. (Otherwise Assumption I trivially

























k equals the probability that µ¡i is such that ±
¤(µ
r
i;µ ¡i)=xk.T h u s ,i tm u s t
be ®k
ii 6= 0 for a k such that ¸
k 6= 0. In other words, the decision xk must be e±cient
for µ
r
i and all µ¡i in an open subset O¡i of £¡i.L e tj be the player for which ®k
ji 6=0 .




















and, as a result, ¢i(µ
r
i;µ i) > 0 (recall the assumption that any open subset of £i has
positive probability measure). This concludes the proof.
The condition that if ®k
ii 6=0t h e n®k
ji 6=0f o ra tl e a s ta n o t h e rp l a y e rj says that if
i's signal regarding decision xk is relevant for i, then it must be relevant for at least
another player j. If this were not the case, then when the decision is xk player i has
a private signals, and an untruthful report of this signal could not be detected by the
payo® observations of the other players.
In the second version of the model, each player always has private signals; e.g.,
i's signal µ
k
ii only a®ects the payo® of player i when the decision is xk. This explains
why in this case full surplus extraction is unobtainable; the designer has no way of
30ever ¯nding out that player i untruthfully reported µ
k
ii.
Proposition 6 Suppose players' payo® functions are given by (15), £i is a compact
subset of RKN for all i,a n df o ra l lk such that xk 2 X is the e±cient decision in an
open subset of £ there exist i such that ®k
ii 6=0 . Then full surplus extraction is not
possible.
Proof. Let k be such that xk 2 X is the e±cient decision in an open subset O
of £, let i be such that ®k
ii 6=0 ,a n dl e t( µi;µ ¡i) be in the interior of O.T a k eµ
r
i so






































h equals the probability that µ¡i is such that ±
¤(µ
r
i;µ ¡i)=xh. Then, Assump-
tion I requires ¢i(µ
r




















as a result, ¢i(µ
r
i;µ i) = 0, and Assumption I does not hold. This concludes the proof.
Note that the condition ®k
ii 6= 0 guarantees that lying about his private type µ
k
ii
is pro¯table to player i. This is su±cient to make full surplus extraction impossible
in this version of the model.
6 Information Acquisition
In a recent paper, Bergemann and VÄ alimÄ aki (2002) posed the following question:
Is it possible to construct mechanisms that (i) provide agents with the incentives
31to acquire the ex-ante e±cient level of information, and (ii) implement the ex-post
e±cient decision rule? They showed that the answer is yes in the case of private values.
In the case of interdependent valuations (\common values" in their terminology), they
restricted attention to standard revelation mechanisms and to the case in which types
are single dimensional and a single-crossing, or sorting, condition is satis¯ed, so that
standard revelation mechanisms that implement the ex-post e±cient decision rule
exist. Nevertheless, they showed that no such mechanism provides agents with the
incentives for e±cient ex-ante information acquisition. In their words, \ex-ante and
ex-post e±ciency cannot be reconciled" (see also Maskin (1992) for a preliminary
investigation of this issue).
In this section I will show that by allowing the designer to use generalized revela-
tion mechanisms we can achieve both e±cient ex-post decisions and e±cient ex-ante
acquisition of information.
6.1 The Model
To study information acquisition as in Bergemann and VÄ alimÄ aki (2002), I need to
modify the model as follows. There are still n agents and a set X of possible decisions.
However, there is now a set of possible states of the world, ­ = £n
i=1­i,w h e r e­i
is a ¯nite set for all i. The prior marginal distributions qi(!i), !i 2 ­, are common
knowledge. The qi's are independent, so that for all ! 2 ­ the common prior is
q(!)=
Qn
i=1 qi(!i). Agent i's payo® function Ui : X £ R £ ­ ! R depends on the
decision x, his monetary transfer ti, and the state of the world !;w eh a v e
Ui(x;ti;!)=vi(x;!)+ti:
Each agent can acquire additional information in the form of a noisy signal about
the state of the world. Agent i chooses a distribution (the noisy signal) from a
parameterized family of distributions fF®i(µi)g®i2Ai over the space £i of posterior
32probability distributions over ­i (i.e., £i is the unit simplex in Rmi,w h e r emi is the
cardinality of ­i). After choosing a distribution, the agent privately observes the
signal realization µi 2 £i (note that the signal realizations of two di®erent agents
are independent). The signal realization µi corresponds to the posterior belief of
agent i over ­i (i.e., µi(!i) is the posterior probability attached to !i 2 ­i). The
parameter space Ai is a compact interval in R and each F ®i(µi) is continuous in ®i
in the topology of weak convergence. The cost of acquiring information ci(®i)i sa
continuous function of ®i. The parameter ®i can be interpreted as the signal, or
statistical experiment, chosen by agent i.
A posterior over the state of the world ! =( !1;:::;!n)i sg i v e nb yµ(!)=
Qn
i=1 µi(!i). We can then write the expected payo® of agent i from decision x,c o n -





If ui only depends on µi values are private, while if ui depends on the whole vector
µ, then valuations are interdependent. The decision rule ±
¤ :£! X is (ex-post)







As before, I will assume that ±
¤(µ)i sa l w a y sw e l ld e ¯ n e d .
















ci(®i)( 1 6 )
where F ®(µ)=£n
i=1F®i(µi).
Bergemann and VÄ alimÄ aki (2002) showed that it is impossible to implement an
33ex-ante e±cient allocation with standard revelation mechanisms when valuations are
interdependent. In other words, with interdependent valuations no standard revela-
tion mechanism that implements the ex-post e±cient decision rule provides agents
with the incentives for e±cient information acquisition. To see why, it is useful to
look at a simple example.
Example 4. There is an item for sale and two potential buyers, whose valuations
for the item are
u1 =3 !1
u2 =1 + °!1
where !1 2f 0;1g is the state of the world (there are only two possible states),
and ° 2 [¡1;1] is a known parameter. The prior probability that !1 = 1 is common
knowledge and equal to 1=2. Buyer 1 can choose a private signal from a set fF ®1(µ1)g
at a cost c1(®1), with ®1 2 A1; a privately observed signal realization µ1 corresponds to
buyer 1's posterior about the probability that !1 =1 .A ni n c r e a s ei n®1 corresponds
to a more precise signal, and hence to a probability measure with more mass around
the endpoints 0 and 1. After observing a signal realization µ1, e±ciency requires that
b u y e r1g e tt h ei t e mi fµ1 > 1=(3¡°)a n dt h a tb u y e r2g e ti ti fµ1 < 1=(3¡°). Note
that @ui=@µ1 > 0a n d@ui=@µ1 >@ u 2=@µ1, so that, as shown by Maskin (1992) and
Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), an e±cient standard revelation mechanism exists. If
the designer is constrained to use standard revelation mechanisms, then the e±cient
















where h1 is a constant. (I need not specify the transfer to agent 2, since it does not play
a role in guaranteeing incentive compatibility. As in Bergemann and VÄ alimÄ aki (2002),
34at least for the time being, I will not be concerned with the issue of balancing the
budget.) To check that incentive compatibility is satis¯ed, note that if µ1 > 1=(3¡°)
then misreporting his \type" only a®ects agent 1's payo® if he reports µ
r
1 < 1=(3¡°)
and the item goes to buyer 2. However, such a misrepresentation decreases buyer 1's
payo®, since h1 +3 =(3 ¡ °) < 3µ1 + h1. Similarly, if µ1 < 1=(3 ¡ °) reporting a type
µ
r
1 > 1=(3¡°) decreases buyer 1's payo®, since in this case h1+3=(3¡°) > 3µ1+h1.
Ex-ante e±cient information acquisition requires that the signal be chosen so as



















®1(µ1) ¡ c1(®1): (17)

























®1(µ1) ¡ c1(®1): (18)


















when ¯ = 0, the program above corresponds to (17) and when ¯ = 1, it corresponds
















Note also that, for µ1 < 1=(3 ¡ °),
3
3 ¡ °
¡ (1 + °µ1) > 0 if and only if °>0:
Since an increase in ®1 puts more mass around 0 and 1 in the measure with distri-








¡ (1 + °µ1)
¸
:
Thus, if °>0, then @®1=@¯ > 0 and buyer 1 has an incentive to over-invest in
information acquisition, while if °<0, then @®1=@¯ < 0 and buyer 1 has an incentive
to under-invest in information acquisition. Only if ° = 0, the case of private values,
does agent 1 have an incentive to acquire the (ex-ante) e±cient level of information (in
that case (17) and (18) coincide). The intuition is the following. The social surplus
as a function of the posterior µ1 is maxf3µ1;1+°µ1g, while the private payo® of agent
1i sm a x f3µ1;2=(3 ¡ °)g. Hence, at the pivotal type µ1 =3 =(3 ¡ °), if °>0, then
the private payo® function is more convex than the social surplus function, while the
opposite is true if °<0. Since information is more valuable the more convex is the
payo® function, if °>0 buyer 1 has an incentive to over-acquire information, while
if °<0 he has an incentive to under-acquire information. Bergemann and VÄ alimÄ aki
(2002) showed that this result holds in general if one restricts attention to standard
revelation mechanisms (a ¯rst, less general, version of this ine±ciency result can be
found in Maskin (1992)).
I now show that this ine±ciency in the ex-ante acquisition of information dis-
36appears if the mechanism designer is allowed to condition transfers on the players'
reports of their realized payo®s. The following transfer functions implement the ex-




































where h1 and h2 are constants. Truthful payo® reporting in the second reporting




and agent 1's expected payo® (conditional on his posterior µ1) from reporting µ
r
1 in

















which is maximized at µ
r
1 = µ1. Telling the truth is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Hence, the private bene¯t, or payo®, of agent 1 is maxf3µ1 +h1;1+°µ1 +h1g which
is equal, up to the constant h1, to the social surplus. This implies that agent 1
has the correct incentive to acquire the ex-ante e±cient level of information. There
is no con°ict between ex-post decision e±ciency and ex-ante e±cient information
acquisition. Note that by setting h1 = h2 = 0, the mechanism designer can also
balance the budget (as we shall see, this result does not generalize).
I am now ready to show that ex-post decision e±ciency and e±cient ex-ante
information acquisition are compatible under very general conditions.
Proposition 7 Whether or not valuations are interdependent, it is always possible to
37construct an ex-post e±cient perfect Bayesian mechanism which also provides agents
with the incentives for the ex-ante e±cient acquisition of information.

















where the charges hi are independent of µ
r
i. It is simple to check that truthtelling
is a Bayesian equilibrium (the reasoning is similar to the one found in the proof of
Proposition 2); hence, the speci¯ed generalized revelation mechanism implements the
ex-post e±cient decision rule.
It remains to show that each agent has the incentive to acquire the ex-ante e±cient
level of information. Given the speci¯ed mechanism and truthtelling in the ex-post










®(µ) ¡ ci(®i): (19)














®(µ) ¡ ci(®i): (20)
On the other hand, ex-ante e±cient information acquisition requires that the signals
be chosen so as to solve the maximization program in (16). The solutions to the
maximization programs (16) and (20) coincide.
It is important to note that the proposition does not say anything about balancing
38the budget. (Bergemann and VÄ alimÄ aki (2002) do not address the issue of balancing
the budget either.) It turns out that it is generally not possible to achieve ex-post
decision e±ciency, e±cient ex-ante information acquisition and to balance the budget.
To see why this is so, suppose that the designer uses the generalized VCG mechanism










where the charges hi are de¯ned by equation (6). Then, given truthtelling at the ex-
post stage and equation (7), at the ex-ante information acquisition stage each agent











which yields a solution with less information acquisition than the socially e±cient
solution to the ex-ante information acquisition program in (16).
While balancing the budget is not possible, as we saw in Section 4 it is always
possible to run a surplus (e.g., in the case of an auction, to make sure that the
auctioneer collects positive revenue), by selecting the transfer function de¯ned in (5).
With these transfers, the charges hi(µ
r
¡i) used in the proof of Proposition 7 are
hi(µ
r








The general lesson of this paper is that when there are informational externalities, the
options of the designer are enhanced by exploiting the informational spillovers that
are associated with a decision. A related point had been made by Hansen (1985) and
Cr¶ emer (1987) (see also Samuelson (1987)). They showed that if the value of an asset
39(e.g., a target ¯rm) to the winning bidder (e.g., the acquiring ¯rm) becomes publicly
known ex-post, then the seller can raise its revenue by using contingent payments as
opposed to cash auctions.
This lesson does not seem to have been missed in the real world. For example, ¯rms
frequently survey costumers about their level of satisfaction and then give bonuses to
their employees based on these surveys. Furthermore, as pointed out by Samuelson
(1987) \contingent pricing schemes are common in actual practice, where examples
range from corporate acquisition via exchange of securities, to revenue sharing in oil
lease auctions, and incentive contracts in defense procurement."
The generalized VCG mechanism introduced in this paper contains contingent
payments, because the transfers to all bidders depend on the realized payo®s. This
paper's setup is much more general, however, than the one in Hansen (1985) and
Cr¶ emer (1987). More importantly, I do not require that information becomes public,
but I rely instead on the agents' reports of their own realized payo®s. Thus, the
payments in the generalized VCG mechanism are contingent on the reported payo®s,
not on publicly observable payo®s.
Some authors (e.g., Dasgupta and Maskin (2000)) have claimed that the mecha-
nism design methods I used in this paper are too informationally demanding, requiring
the designer to have information about the signal spaces of the agents and the func-
tional forms of the agents' payo®s. While I acknowledge that greater informational
simplicity is valuable, I want to o®er two arguments in defense of my approach.
First, the full force of the mechanism design methods allows us to see how far
we can go in implementing outcomes. Thus, I was able to reach conclusions that
are in sharp contrast with the results one obtains with standard mechanisms (i.e.,
if contingent payments are not allowed). I have shown that e±cient decisions can
always be achieved. I characterized the conditions under which one can have full
surplus extraction. Finally, I have shown that the e±cient ex-ante acquisition of
information can also always be obtained.
40Second, the general lesson of the paper, that information that follows from an
outcome should be exploited to achieve e±ciency, or surplus extraction, goes be-
yond the abstract mechanism design approach. For example, I conjecture that less
informationally demanding game forms can be constructed in many situations that
implement the e±cient outcomes, by using payments that depend on the reported
payo®s of the agents. I have undertaken some preliminary research that supports this
conjecture; I hope to report its development in a future paper.
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